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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court refused to consider
depictions of animal cruelty as a form of speech outside of First
Amendment protection.' Consequently, the Court struck down the federal
statute criminalizing such depictions as overbroad.2 Stevens is largely cited
to demonstrate the Supreme Court's reluctance to create a new category of
speech that is outside of First Amendment protection.3 However, Stevens
demonstrates another important proposition in First Amendment
jurisprudence-that a statutory exception modeled after the Miller v.
California obscenity standard is not a dependable way to protect a
nonobscenity statute.4
Legislatures whose regulations are likely to be challenged on free
speech grounds sometimes include statutory exceptions as a way to limit
the scope of the regulation and avoid constitutional invalidation from the
"strong medicine"5 of the overbreadth doctrine. Often, statutory exceptions
borrow language from the obscenity standard formulated in Miller. The
Miller exceptions clause prevents a statute from criminalizing behavior that
has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value.6 The Stevens holding significantly undermines
the usefulness of the Miller statutory exceptions in nonobscenity statutes
and calls into question the constitutionality of existing statutes using these
statutory exceptions.
Part II of this Note will discuss the use and prevalence of statutory
exceptions modeled after the Miller obscenity test. Part III of this Note will
1. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
2. Id. at 1592.
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
4. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
5. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).
6. United States v. Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 178 2011-2012
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
review the role of the overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Part IV of this Note will examine the reasoning and
implications of the Supreme Court's ruling in Stevens. Finally, Part V of
the Note will explore the possibility that, in light of recent Supreme Court
action, statutes that borrow from the exceptions clause in the Miller
standard may be at risk of invalidation. Therefore, legislatures should
consider modifying some existing statutes and not using the Miller
exceptions clause in new legislation.
II. THE MILLER OBSCENITY STANDARD AND STATUTORY
EXCEPTIONS
A. Overview
The Supreme Court has a storied history of struggling to formulate a
proper definition of obscenity. Most notoriously, Justice Stewart, in a
concurrence, had the following comments on this process: "perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly [defining obscenity] .. .. But I know it when I
see it . . . ." Eventually, the Court formulated the present-day obscenity
standard in Miller v. California.
In Miller, California convicted the defendant of obscenity for mailing
unsolicited brochures that contained descriptive printed material and
pictures of men and women engaged in a variety of sexual activities.9 In a
previous decision, the Court recorized that obscene materials are not
protected by the First Amendment, but the Court struggled to formulate a
proper definition for obscenity. By declaring obscenity a special category
of speech outside of First Amendment protection, the Court allows
obsceni t4 statutes to be scrutinized with a rational basis standard of
review. In contrast, protected categories of speech are reviewed with a
strict scrutiny standard. Under the rational basis standard, the regulatory
scheme must be reasonably related to a leitimate state interest to enhance
the general welfare of its population. In Miller, the Court finally
7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767 (1967); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. 413 U.S. at 16-18.
10. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 476.
11. George L. Blum, Annotation, Obscenity Prosecutions: Statutory Exemption Based
on Dissemination to Persons or Entities Having Scientific, Educational, or Similar
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developed an obscenity standard immune from First Amendment
invalidation.
The Court in Miller held that the following elements must be satisfied
for a statute to constitutionally regulate obscenity:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, take P4as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
This Note primarily focuses on the last element of the Miller standard,
which will be referred to as the exceptions clause. As discussed in the next
section of this Note, legislatures occasionally borrow the language from
this exceptions clause and adapt it to statutes regulating other categories of
speech besides obscenity, especially in circumstances where the category
of speech has not been judicially declared to be outside of First
Amendment protection. By borrowing from the Supreme Court-endorsed
standard for obscenity, legislatures attempt to both increase legitimacy and
protect their regulation of speech.
B. Nonobscenity Contexts
Understandably, the Miller standard's exceptions clause is adopted
most frequently by legislatures regulating obscenity. However, in limited
situations, legislatures have also adopted the clause in nonobscenity
contexts. As Stevens demonstrates, Congress adopted the exceptions clause
for a statute that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty.' 5
Another context in which legislatures have adopted the obscenity
standard's exceptions clause is in statutes regulating the depictions of
violence in video games and movies. In fact, the Supreme Court recently
invalidated a California statute regulating the depictions of violence in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.17 Similar to the statute in
Stevens, the California legislature included an exceptions clause modeled
after the obscenity standard.19 Other than depictions of violence, there are
14. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
15. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
16. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1 (Deering 2010) (prohibiting the sale or rental of
violent video games to minors); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-601 (2010) (prohibiting the sale or
rental of violent movies to minors); MICH. COMP. LAws SERv. § 722.691 (LexisNexis 2011)
(prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors).
17. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n., 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
18. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia refers to the exceptions clause as a "saving
clause." Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 1.
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statutes and municipal ordinances that target behavior more comparable to
obscenity by regulating prurient interests. But, arguably, these statutes
and ordinances may not target behavior that rises to the level of obscenity,
especially since they do not adopt the entire obscenity standard, even
though they model the Miller obscenity standard and contain an exceptions
element.2 1
Although these statutes and ordinances apply to three general areas of
regulation outside of obscenity-depictions of animal cruelty, depictions of
violence, and adult entertainment-it is likely that future legislative bodies
will find new targets of speech for regulation that they believe is of low
value and undeserving of First Amendment protection. In Stevens, Justice
Roberts even noted, "[w]e need not foreclose the future recognition of such
additional categories [of unprotected speech]."22 Thus, the majority in
Stevens left open the possibility for the creation of new categories of
unprotected speech. Admittedly, this possibility is more difficult based on
the majority's stipulation that any future categories be "historically
unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as
such in our case law.',23 Still, legislative bodies will most likely attempt to
increase the number of unprotected categories of speech with the rise of
new legislative agendas, and may even use an exceptions clause to narrow
the scope of the statute.
III. THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE IN FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
If a law is overinclusively drafted, a party whose conduct is within the
statute's intended proscription still benefits with an overbreadth challenge
by effectively asserting the rights of other hypothetical persons whose
protected activity falls within the sweep of the statute.24 Normally, a party
seeking to challenge a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that his
or her personal rights were violated in order to have standing. However, the
overbreadth doctrine is a "narrow exception to [the] general [standing]
20. Prurient interests are interests "[c]haracterized by or arousing inordinate or unusual
sexual desire." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1347 (9th ed. 2009).
21. See, e.g., LARIMER COUNTY, COLO., LARIMER COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-
82 (2010) (regulating nudity in places of entertainment); WALTON COUNTY, FLA., WALTON
CoUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-27 (2009) (regulating adult entertainment enterprises and
establishments); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-226 (2010) (regulating the suspension or revocation
of alcohol licenses).
22. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 847
(1970).
Number I] 18 1
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rule" because "an overly broad law may deter constitutionally protected
speech . . . ."25 In more colorful language, the overbreadth doctrine has
been described as "strong medicine . . . a potion that generally should be
administered only as a last resort." 26
Two purposes have been suggested for the overbreadth doctrine. First,
overbroad laws can chill constitutionally protected speech. The overbreadth
doctrine prevents the chilling of constitutionally protected speech by
creating a distinct exception to the standing requirement, which, in effect,
allows any litigant willing to challenge an allegedly overbroad statute to
bring suit.2 7 Second, the overbreadth doctrine encourages legislatures to be
aware of free speech issues when drafting legislation because the statute
will be especially vulnerable to constitutional challenges.28 The threat of a
court invalidating a statute as overbroad incentivizes the legislatures to
narrowly tailor their statutes.
According to the Supreme Court, the overbreadth doctrine was first
recognized in the 1940 case of Thornhill v. Alabama.29 Thus, the doctrine
is relatively new to American jurisprudence. Interestingly, the overbreadth
doctrine can be applied to both statutes that regulate categories of speech
receiving First Amendment protection30 and categories of speech outside
First Amendment protection. 31 Many scholars embrace the overbreadth
doctrine and advocate using the doctrine beyond the First Amendment
context.3 2
By applying the overbreadth doctrine, a court considers the
constitutionality of a statute on its face.33 In order for an overbreadth
challenge to succeed, the "overbreadth of a statute must not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 34 Substantial overbreadth is not satisfied merely because a litigant
can point to one or a few hypothetical fact patterns under which application
of the statute would be unconstitutional. 35 Moreover, to determine whether
25. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593 (Alito, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
27. Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 113, 116 (2005).
28. Id.
29. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984); see
also Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
30. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577.
31. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (applying the overbreadth doctrine to
a statute regulating fighting words).
32. Meier, supra note 27, at 114.
33. Id. at 129.
34. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
35. Meier, supra note 27, at 131.
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a statute is overbroad, courts should "consider a statute's application to
real-world conduct, not fanciful hypotheticals," and the "claimant bears the
burden of demonstrating, 'from the text of [the law] and from actual fact,'
that substantial overbreadth exists." 36 "[T]here must be a realistic danger
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially
challenged on overbreadth grounds."37
IV. IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. STEVENS
In this section, this Note examines the recent Supreme Court case
United States v. Stevens in a significant amount of detail. This section
examines Stevens so closely for two reasons-Stevens has important
implications for both protected category of speech analysis and also the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. The legal reasoning of the Third
Circuit's opinion in Stevens demonstrated the traditional reasoning that
courts use to analyze constitutional arguments advocating for the creation
of a new unprotected category of speech. However, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Stevens reshaped the traditional analysis for similar future
claims.38 The Third Circuit's analysis in Stevens is no longer the proper
method to assess arguments for a new category of unprotected First
Amendment speech. The Supreme Court decided the Stevens case in a
highly unusual manner by limiting existing precedent, and then invalidating
Congress's statute as overbroad. 9 The potential implications of Stevens
cannot be fully appreciated without a detailed review of the case.
A. Background
The Stevens Court considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 48
("Section 48"), which prohibited the interstate sale and distribution of
depictions of animal cruelty.40 The law was enacted to address the
36. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1594 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003)) (italics omitted).
37. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).
38. As demonstrated by Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the traditional
strict scrutiny analysis for content-based restrictions of speech is still viable and likely used
in future First Amendment challenges. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n., 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011). Nevertheless, Stevens may indicate that statutory overbreadth is an alternative
to strict scrutiny review for some First Amendment challenges.
39. In a footnote, the Brown majority doubted Justice Alito's assertion that Stevens did
not apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 4 n. 1. However, this Note agrees with Justice Alito, and the
Stevens opinion clearly supports the assertion that the Court did not apply strict scrutiny
review in Stevens. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
40. Emma Ricaurte, Note, Son of Sam and Dog of Sam: Regulating Depictions of
Animal Cruelty Through the use of Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes, 16 ANIMAL L. 171, 183
183Number 1]
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proliferation of animal "crush videos" on the Internet; however, individuals
were also prosecuted for possessing, creating, or selling other depictions of
animal cruelty.41 An animal crush video is "a film in which a female,
typically in a dominatrix manner, is seen crushing a small animal with her
bare feet or high-heeled shoes.'4 2 There is evidence that Section 48
successfully weakened the crush video market.43
Section 48 has three elements. First, someone must knowingly create,
sell, or possess a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placin
that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain.4
Second, the statute has an exceptions clause that exempts from regulation
any depiction of animal cruelty which has "serious religious, 5political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value."4 Finally,
the statute has a definition section that defines animal cruelty and also
requires the animal cruelty to depict illegal conduct under the federal or
state law in the location where the creation, sale, or possession of the
depiction of animal cruelty occurs.
In Stevens, the defendant was charged with distributing two videos of
pit bulls engaged in dogfighting and another video that depicted a pit bull
attacking a domestic ig in an instructional video on how to use pit bulls to
catch wild animals. One of the dogfighting videos showed footage from
the 1960s and 1970s, while the other showed recent footage of dogfighting
in Japan, where dogfighting is still legal.48 Stevens also ran a business
called "Dogs of Velvet and Steel" and a website.49 Stevens advertised the
videos in the Sporting Dog Journal, which is an underground periodical
that posts results for illegal dogfighting matches.50 It is unclear from the
legislative history whether depictions of dogfighting were intended to be
covered by Section 48.51
After being convicted of violating Section 48, Stevens appealed to the
Third Circuit. Stevens argued that Section 48 is an unconstitutional
(2009).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 173.
43. The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REv. 179, 239 (2010)
[hereinafter Leading Cases].
44. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582.
45. Id. at 1582-83.
46. Id. at 1582.




51. Id. at 185.
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infringement of his free speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The government argued that the Third Circuit should
recognize depictions of animal cruelty as a new category of unprotected
speech.5 3
The Third Circuit's analysis can be described as a two-step process.
First, the Third Circuit applied the five factors enumerated in New York v.
Ferber54 to assess whether there is sufficient justification to categorically
exclude depictions of animal cruelty from First Amendment protection.
After finding the categorical exclusion unjustified, the Third Circuit
applied strict scrutiny analysis to Section 48 because the statute was a
content-based restriction on speech. The statute failed strict scrutiny.5 5
In Ferber, the Supreme Court held that child pornography is a
category of speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment, and
legislatures can ban the sale of this material.56 The Court balanced the
following five factors to find that governmental regulation outweighs First
Amendment protection: (1) the prevention of child sexual exploitation is an
extremely important governmental interest; (2) the distribution of child
pornography is intrinsically related to the child's sexual abuse; (3) the
economic incentive to sell child pornography encourages its production and
is integral to the sexual abuse; (4) the value from using real children in
pornographic images is de minimus; and (5) holding child pornography
categorically outside the First Amendment is not inconsistent with
precedent.
The Court engages in definitional balancing in Ferber, "which
involves striking a balance between a category of speech at issue and the
government's interest in regulation based on First Amendment values, for
the purpose of creating rules that can be applied in later cases."5 In
Stevens, the Third Circuit applied the definitional balancing standard of
Ferber.5 9 The Third Circuit in Stevens found that "there was an insufficient
link between the interests of preventing animal cruelty and the Section 48
prohibition. . . ." o Simply put, protecting animals does not rise to the same
level of importance to a well-functioning society as protecting children.61
52. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).
53. Id.
54. 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982).
55. Stevens, 533 F.3d at 232-35.
56. 458 U.S. at 765.
57. Leading Cases, supra note 43, at 244-45.
58. Id. at 245 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2008).
60. Leading Cases, supra note 43, at 241.
61. Id.
185Number 1]
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Therefore, the Third Circuit reviewed the statute with strict scrutiny
because it was a content-based restriction on speech. The Third Circuit held
that the statute failed strict scrutiny because depictions of animal crueltlack a compelling state interest and the statute was not narrowly tailored.
The Third Circuit also mentioned in a footnote that the statute may be
constitutionally overbroad, but that this analysis is unnecessary since the
overbreadth doctrine "should be used sparingly and only as a last resort." 63
B. Supreme Court Review
Although the majority in Stevens affirmed the Third Circuit's holding,
the Court's reasoning was unexpectedly different. Like the Third Circuit
opinion, the majority rejected the government's argument that Section 48 is
a class of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment. However,
the Court significantly narrowed the scope of Ferber by finding
definitional balancing inappropriate for determining categories of speech
outside First Amendment protection. In particular, "[t]he First Amendment
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its
restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution
forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that
some speech is not worth it."64 Ferber is merely a special case because
"child pornography is 'intrinsically related' to the underlying child sexual
abuse."65 Therefore, the analysis in Ferber was limited to its facts, and the
First Amendment no longer allows a definitional balancing standard to
determine new categories of unprotected speech.
After rejecting depictions of animal cruelty for treatment as an
unprotected category of speech, the Court facially analyzed Section 48.
Rather than subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny review like the Third
Circuit, the Court found that Section 48 was unconstitutionally
overbroad.66 In doing so, the Court examined the statute for "proof ... that
62. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).
63. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
64. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
65. Leading Cases, supra note 43, at 242 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
759 (1982)).
66. Although animal welfare activists largely condemn the Court's ruling as a
significant blow to animal welfare by not finding depictions of animal cruelty unprotected
from the First Amendment, the Court's analysis may actually be less damaging than it
appears. In particular, the Court could have simply followed the Third Circuit's reasoning
and held that depictions of animal cruelty are protected by the First Amendment and fail
strict scrutiny review. By invalidating the statute as overbroad, however, the Court avoided
the question of whether regulating animal cruelty is a compelling government interest. A
Supreme Court ruling that animal cruelty is not a compelling government interest could
conceivably have implications outside of the First Amendment context. Instead, the Court
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a law has a 'substantial number' of unconstitutional applications . . . ."
The Court noted that the prosecution's use of the statute could conceivably
target depictions of hunting, slaughter for food, docking of cow tails, and
cockfighting which are all legal activities in at least one United States
jurisdiction.
C. The Rejection of Statutory Exceptions
During the Supreme Court's analysis of Section 48 for overbreadth,
the Court rejected the statute's exceptions clause as "requir[ing] an
unrealistically broad reading .. . . 69 The statute exempted "any depiction
that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value" from criminalization. 70 This statutory language
is largely drawn from the Court's "opinion in Miller v. Caifornia, which
excepted from its definition of obscenity any material with serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." 7 In Stevens, the Court flatly rejected
the contention that statutory exceptions modeled after the obscenity
standard can be used as a "general precondition to protecting other types of
speech in the first place." 72
The Court also noted that "[t]here is simply no adequate reading of
the exceptions clause that results in the statute's banning only the
depictions the Government would like to ban." 73 As an example, the Court
points to the inability of the statute to distinguish between depictions of
hunting and Spanish bullfights from depictions of Japanese dogfights, the
former was not intended to be targeted by Section 48.74 The Court also
responds to the dissent's suggestion that hunting depictions have serious
value and qualify for the exceptions clause in ways that dogfights
presumably do not. The Court explains that the analysis requires looking at
left open the possibility for Congress to modify Section 48, which Congress did in 2010. See
18 U.S.C. § 48 (2000 & Supp. 2010).
67. Leading Cases, supra note 43, at 242 (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587).
68. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588-90.
69. Id. at 1590.
70. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
71. Id. at 1591 (citations omitted).
72. Id. The Court recently echoed this position in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). The California statute regulated minors' access to
violent video games and mimicked a New York statute upheld by the Court in Ginsberg v.
New York that protected minors from accessing obscene materials. Id. at 2735. Unlike
Stevens, however, the Court invalidated the video game statute with traditional strict
scrutiny review for being a content-based restriction on speech. Id. at 2738.
73. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
74. Id.
Number 1] 187
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"the value of the depictions, not of the underlying activity."7 5 Thus, the
majority implies that the depictions do not have the same serious value as
the activity itself, and would not be rescued by the exceptions clause of
Section 48.
D. Justice Alito's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Alito disagreed with the majority's application
of the overbreadth doctrine. Rather, Alito would have remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals to decide whether the videos that Stevens actually
sold were constitutionally protected as opposed to the majority's facial
invalidation of the statute. Furthermore, Alito said that even if he agreed
to apply the overbreadth doctrine, he disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the statute "bans a substantial quantity of protected
speech." 77 Alito emphasized that the overbreadth doctrine's "generally
preferred procedure ... [is one of] last resort." Moreover, the overbreadth
must "be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep" 79 by considering the statute's
"application to real-world conduct, not fanciful hypotheticals."80
Alito rejected the majority's hypotheticals of protected speech that are
allegedly covered by Section 48. He individually analyzed each
hypothetical and provided explanations for why the hypotheticals qualify
for the statute's exceptions clause.82 Specifically, he rejected the majority's
contention that hunting, animal slaughter, and tail docking are covered by
the statute because the statute expressly targets "animal cruelty" and also
has the exceptions clause. Alito mentioned,
[T]hat hunting has "scientific" value in that it promotes conservation,
"historical" value in that it provides a link to past times when hunting
played a critical role in daily life, and "educational" value in that it
furthers the understanding and apprecia n of nature in our country's
past and instills valuable character traits.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1593.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1594.
79. Id. (emphasis omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1594-97.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1596.
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Besides, even if there are a few isolated applications for hunting that fall
outside the exceptions clause, those "would hardly show that Section 48
bans a substantial amount of protected speech."85
Moreover, there was nothing in the record to suggest that anyone has
ever sold or possessed for sale a depiction of the slaughtering or docking of
dairy cows' tails. Alito also says Section 48 is not overbroad because it
requires the depictions to be of animal cruelty as defined by state or federal
law. Even if cockfighting was covered by the statute, "this veritable sliver
of unconstitutionality would not be enough to justify striking down § 48 in
toto."8 After rejecting the majority's constitutional overbreadth holding,
Alito applied the Ferber balancing analysis to crush videos and depictions
of brutal animal fights, and concluded that these categories should be
unprotected under the First Amendment, similar to child pornography. 89
E. Congress's Response to Stevens
Interestingly, the Stevens majority said, "[w]e . . . need not and do not
decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of
extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional."90 Although the Supreme
Court's invalidation of Section 48 drew the ire from animal rights and
welfare supporters,91 the Court could have certainly taken the impact of
their opinion further by making it impossible to criminalize depictions of
animal cruelty. Instead, the Court leaves the opportunity for Congress to
modify the statute in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
Congress accepted this opportunity and modified Section 48 in
several significant ways. First, Congress narrowed the reach of the statute
by altering the language to only criminalize animal crush videos, instead of
criminalizing more general depictions of animal cruelty.92 In addition to
adding more specific language, Congress narrowed the statute to obscene
animal crush videos.93 Congress also removed the exceptions clause from
the statute, and expressly listed the hypotheticals posed by the majority in
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1597.
87. Id. at 1595.
88. Id. at 1597.
89. Id. at 1601.
90. Id. at 1592.
91. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, The First Amendment and Kittens, N.Y. TIMES, April 26,
2010, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/the-first-amendment-and-kittens/#
more-47485; Simon, United States v. Stevens, STUBBORN FACTS, (April 26, 2010, 9:59 PM),
http://stubbomfacts.us/law/unitedstates_v_stevens.
92. 18 U.S.C. §48(a) (2000 & Supp.2010).
93. § 48(a)(2).
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Stevens as exceptions. 94 For instance, Congress exempted hunting,
trapping, fishing, the slaughter of animals for food, and "customary and
"95
normal veterinary or agricultural husbandry practices . . . ." Congress's
final modification was to enhance the punishment for violating the statute
to possible imprisonment for not more than seven years.96
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
The majority's decision to invalidate the statute on overbreadth
grounds despite the presence of the exceptions clause raises interesting
concerns about the effectiveness of an exceptions clause to protect against
statutory overbreadth, especially when used outside of the obscenity
context. The rest of this Note will explore the impact of the Stevens'
overbreadth analysis on Miller exceptions clauses, and suggest concerns
that legislative bodies should be aware of when drafting future legislation
or protecting existing statutes that advocate for new categories of
unprotected speech.
A. Relevance
Before discussing the constitutional weight the exceptions clauses
have as a narrowing function, an important consideration, regardless of the
legal issue presented, is whether discussing or resolving the issue is
actually of any practical importance. Discussion of this issue is important
for several reasons. First, if a legislature plans to expressly advocate for a
new category of unprotected speech by creating regulations modeled after
the Miller obscenity standard, the Supreme Court's analysis in Stevens may
raise serious concerns for an overbreadth challenge to their statute. A
successful overbreadth challenge effectively invalidates a test case before
arguing the merits of a new unprotected category of speech.
Second, Stevens presents an instance in Supreme Court jurisprudence
where the overbreadth doctrine was not used as "a last resort,"97 but instead
94. Congress's changes to Section 48 present an interesting issue. Congress not only
addressed the Supreme Court's overbreadth concerns by exempting the hypotheticals posed
by the Court, but Congress also added an obscenity requirement to the statute. An
interesting debate would be whether Congress really needed to enhance the exceptions
clause with specific exceptions after already adding an obscenity requirement to the statute.
The Court already recognizes the obscenity standard as constitutional, and it seems that the
very act of adding this requirement should narrowly tailor the statute enough to prevent
overbreadth invalidation of the statute. In effect, the new version of Section 48 is simply an
obscenity statute that focuses on the narrow area of animal crush videos. Arguably, the new
version of Section 48 is overly cautious and the obscenity element would be sufficient.
95. § 48(e)(1)(A).
96. § 48(d).
97. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1593 (2010) (quoting L.A. Police Dept.
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was possibly a strategic remedy to avoid traditional First Amendment
analysis of categories of speech. Although speculative, Stevens could pave
the way for more frequent usage of the overbreadth doctrine, and
legislatures need to be aware of this possibility when drafting regulations.
In particular, lower courts may consider the overbreadth treatment of
Section 48 in Stevens as the Supreme Court's willingness to expand usage
of the overbreadth doctrine beyond a remedy of last resort. Since
overbreadth challenges are an important exception to standing, the Court's
treatment may encourage more overbreadth lawsuits in the future. 98
Finally, there are some existing statutes, although limited in number,
which could presently be at risk for invalidation because the statutes are
outside the obscenity context yet borrow language from the obscenity
standard. The exceptions clause may be unable to rescue these statutes
from future overbreadth challenges. The Court's treatment accentuates the
value of narrowly drafting legislation that affects First Amendment rights.
B. The Exceptions Clause's Failure to Protect from Overbreadth
The practical effect of the holding in Miller has been for legislatures
criminalizing obscenity to adopt the Miller standard verbatim into their
statutory scheme.99 By adopting the Miller standard, these states are
protecting their obscenity statutes from all grounds of constitutional
invalidation, including overbreadth. However, in Stevens, the Court refused
to allow the exceptions clause's language in Miller to prevent overbreadth
in the context of a statute regulating depictions of animal cruelty.
The holdings of Miller and Stevens raise an interesting conflict.
Simply put, why does the Supreme Court dismiss the importance of the
exceptions clause in the overbreadth analysis of Stevens, but allow it to be
an essential element of the obscenity standard? Certainly, the exceptions
clause's narrowing function could have been ignored in Stevens if the Court
engaged in traditional strict scrutiny analysis and held that Section 48 fails
strict scrutiny.
But instead, by applying overbreadth analysis, the Court examines
whether the statute's language is precise enough to satisfy constitutional
scrutiny. The "overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98. As a practical matter, an argument relying solely on overbreadth seems less
convincing without an actual defendant whose behavior resulted in prosecution under the
statute, especially when the defendant's behavior seems outside the original intent of the
statute.
99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.1(17) (2010); FLA. STAT. § 847.001(10) (2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4101(A) (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106(A)(3)(b) (2010).
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substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."loo The Court held that the statute is overbroad because other
protected speech will hypothetically fall within the statute's scope
regardless of whether depictions of animal cruelty are protected. Although
the overbreadth doctrine is used as a last resort to invalidate a statute, the
Court in Stevens seemed to ignore this principle and invalidated the statute
as overbroad regardless.
It is true, as Justice Roberts notes, that the Court has never officially
sanctioned the Miller exceptions clause for use outside of obscenity. But,
that explanation does not satisfactorily explain why the language of the
exceptions clause carries less significance for narrowly tailoring Section 48
than the language does in an obscenity statute. Therefore, this Note
proposes several possible explanations that could explain why the
exceptions clause's language in the obscenity context is protected from
overbreadth invalidation, but the language is insufficient to protect Section
48.
1. Differences in Statutory Subject Matters
One suggestion is that there are fundamental differences in statutory
subject matters-obscenity versus depictions of animal cruelty-that affect
the strength of the exceptions clause's narrowing function. The majority's
analysis in Stevens seems to support this suggestion. In other words, the
exceptions clause is less successful at protecting from overbreadth in
depictions of animal cruelty because the statute is inherently more likely to
regulate legitimate activity outside the scope of the statute. Thus, a more
specific exceptions clause is required to protect the statute from
overbreadth invalidation.
Supporting this suggestion, the majority in Stevens listed several
hypothetical forms of speech covered by the statute irrespective of the
exceptions clause, and declared that the statute was not narrowly tailored
enough to make distinctions between speech intended for regulation, like
dogfighting, and speech not intended for regulation, like bullfighting.10'
Although Justice Alito was the lone dissenter in Stevens, he posed many
compelling responses to counter almost all of the Court's hypotheticals
demonstrating Section 48's overbreadth-Alito's most convincing point
being that many of the Court's hypotheticals easily qualify for Section 48's
exceptions clause.102 By accepting Alito's criticisms as plausible, there
must be other explanations for the Court's dismissal of the exceptions
100. Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
101. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 76-89.
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clause that are not stated in the opinion, rather than just a simple difference
in statutory subject matter.
2. The Limited Narrowing Function of the Exceptions Clause
One possible explanation for the failure of the exceptions clause to
protect against overbreadth may simply be that this Note places too much
weight on the narrowing function of the exceptions clause-both in the
obscenity and the depictions of animal cruelty contexts. Instead, the other
elements of the obscenity standard, in conjunction with the exceptions
clause, narrowly tailor it enough to protect from overbreadth. This may
explain why the majority felt the need to state that Miller did not determine
that the exceptions clause "could be used as a eneral precondition to
protecting other types of speech in the first place." For this explanation
to be logical in the overbreadth context, the other elements of the Miller
obscenity standard must have a greater narrowing function than the other
elements of the animal cruelty statute. By comparing the language of the
obscenity standard with Section 48, this explanation is not entirely
convincing.
The Miller obscenity standard is comprised of the following three
components: (1) whether the average person applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable
state law; and (3) whether the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.10
The elements of Section 48 can be summarized into the following
three components: (1) someone must knowingly create, possess, or sell a
depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in
interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain; (2) depictions that
have serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value are exempted from criminalization; and (3) a
definition section that defines depictions of animal cruelty as including "a
living animal [that] is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded,
or killed, if that conduct violates federal or state law where the creation,
sale, or possession takes place."' 0 5 A comparison between the obscenity
standard and Section 48 demonstrates that, although the components have
subject-matter differences, both, at least, facially seem narrowly tailored to
approximately the same degree.
103. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591.
104. 413 U.S. at 24.
105. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582-83 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The first element of Section 48 does not really narrow the statute's
reach except that it provides both a jurisdictional basis for the federal
government to legislate and also a mens rea requirement.106 However, the
next component of Section 48, the exceptions clause, does narrow the
scope of the statute. In fact, the exceptions clause of Section 48 is more
narrowly tailored than the obscenity standard in this regard because it
includes additional exceptions by exempting material with religious,
educational, journalistic, and historical value.
The only exception not included in Section 48 but included in the
obscenity standard is "serious literary . . . value.',1o7 Arguably, this
exception is substantively covered with the journalistic and artistic value
exceptions in Section 48. Therefore, Section 48 seems more narrowly
tailored than the obscenity standard because it exempts more behavior from
regulation. Furthermore, the exempted categories in both standards are
equally as ambiguous by not listing explicit definitions or examples for the
categories. os The only possible explanation for the exceptions clause
having a greater narrowing function in the obscenity standard than in
Section 48 is that the obscenity standard expressly asks courts to consider
the work "taken as a whole," while Section 48 lacks this language.109
However, the Court in Stevens never acknowledged this difference between
the two exceptions clauses.Il 0
Outside of the obscenity and Section 48's exceptions clauses, the
other components of Section 48 and the obscenity standard are facially
tailored to approximately the same degree. The third element of the animal
cruelty statute expressly defines depictions of animal cruelty, which
basically serves the same function as the first and second elements of the
obscenity standard by defining the targeted behavior. The behavior targeted
in the obscenity standard is patently offensive "sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law' 111 that an average person applying
community standards would find the work, taken as a whole, to "appeal[]
to the prurient interest."1 1 2 Section 48 is slightly broader than the obscenity
standard because it allows depictions of animal cruelty to be defined by
either federal law or state law where the creation, sale, or possession of the
videos takes place. Conceivably, the federal government has at least a
106. Id. at 1582.
107. Id. at 1591 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
108. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at
1583.
109. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
110. See id.
111. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
112. Id.
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couple of choices of law to apply and could shop around for animal cruelty
definitions that are more favorable to the prosecution's case. Conversely,
the obscenity standard only allows the court to use the definition of sexual
conduct defined by "applicable state law."11 3 In this respect, Section 48 is
not as narrowly tailored as the obscenity standard. Nonetheless, Section 48
is still dependent on the facts of the offense, specifically the number of
jurisdictions involved, which restrains the government's complete
discretion to forum shop for a favorable definition in both the standards.
Furthermore, the obscenity standard has the amorphous requirement
of "applying contemporary community standards" 14 to determine whether
the work "appeals to the prurient interest."1 15 This standard is not any
clearer than the express language in Section 48, which describes depictions
of animal cruelty as "a living animal [that] is intentionally maimed,
mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed."I While the obscenity standard
and Section 48 are not identical in many important respects, a facial
examination of their components demonstrates that Section 48 appears to
be as narrowly tailored as the obscenity standard.
3. The Exceptions Clause is Meaningless
A third explanation for the Court's rejection of the exceptions clause
in Section 48, although unlikely, is that the narrowing function of Miller
standard's exceptions clause is insignificant in both the obscenity context
and also in any other context in which it is used. Simply put, the exceptions
clause is too general to significantly narrow the statute. If this is the case,
then the logical step would be to drop the exceptions clause altogether from
the obscenity standard, which has not happened.
4. Different Standards of Overbreadth Analysis
A fourth possibility is that the Court is applying overbreadth analysis
to protected categories of speech more severely than unprotected categories
of speech. In other words, the Court was more critical in the facial
challenge of Section 48 because the Court found that Section 48 targets
protected speech. Since obscenity is an unprotected category of speech, the
Court is likely to be more favorable toward the statute and not find it
overbroad. This explanation, if true, has serious repercussions for First
Amendment overbreadth challenges in the future. For First Amendment
cases, it would be strategic for individuals challenging unprotected
113. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 24.
115. Id.
116. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582.
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categories of speech always to argue statutory overbreadth if the Court is
willing to apply overbreadth with more scrutiny and not as a last resort.
5. Strategic Judicial Behavior
A final possibility was that the Supreme Court wanted to invalidate
Section 48, but wanted to avoid doing so with strict scrutiny review. Put
differently, "a void for overbreadth holding is often taken to be perhaps
laudable but wholly result-oriented handiwork of a Court acting 'as if it had
a roving commission' to find and cure unconstitutionality."11 7 By analyzing
with strict scrutiny, the majority may have to decide whether animal cruelty
is a compelling government interest.118 The overbreadth doctrine was a
convenient remedy to invalidate the statute without finding that animal
cruelty fails strict scrutiny review for not being a compelling government
119interest.
Judge Posner calls this type of judicial decision making the "strategic
theory of judicial behavior," which is also referred to as the positive
political theory of law. 120 This explanation "hypothesizes that judges do
not always vote as they would if they did not have to worry about the
reactions to their votes of other judges . . . ."121 The strategic theory is a
goal-oriented theory of judicial motivation that may explain the Stevens
decision.
Justice Roberts previously stated that he has a strong preference for
unanimity in Supreme Court opinions,122 and although Stevens was one
Justice short of that goal, it is plausible that the overbreadth analysis was a
strategic decision to enhance the number of Justices to sign on to the
majority opinion.123 The application of strict scrutiny review to the animal
cruelty statute could provoke more disagreement among the Justices than
simply invalidating the statute as overbroad.
117. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 24, at 846.
118. Although strict scrutiny is a tough standard to satisfy, it is not an insurmountable
standard and some restrictions on speech survive strict scrutiny review. Brown v. Entm't
Merchs. Ass'n., 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. Of course, the Court is still able to find the statute fails strict scrutiny review for not
being narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means for achieving the statute's interest.
120. RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 29 (2008).
121. Id.
122. See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html.
123. This explanation operates under a presumption that the Justices are political actors
and that their decision making is influenced by more than just application of legal
principles. Some influences could include strategic bargaining and political considerations.
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 196 2011-2012
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
C. Usefulness of the Exceptions Clause
As the discussion in the previous section demonstrates, it is difficult
to decipher exactly why the statutory exceptions in Section 48 failed to
protect the statute from overbreadth, unless one accepts the validity of the
majority's overbroad hypotheticals in its entirety-and even then, it seems
unusual that the majority applied the overbreadth doctrine instead of
traditional strict scrutiny analysis. As presented in the previous section,
there may be several alternative explanations to explain the application of
overbreadth analysis, but there is no clear answer. However, there is a clear
message from Stevens-the usefulness of the Miller exceptions clause is
diminished outside of the obscenity context. This messae was reinforced
in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association. Therefore, an
important consideration is whether legislatures should even bother
modeling future exceptions clauses after the obscenity standard.
If advocating for a new category of unprotected speech, exceptions
clauses should still be used, but the clauses should be more specific than
the obscenity standard's clause. Exceptions clauses are an important
technique to limit the scope of a statute. Stevens indicates that legislatures
must extend their thinking beyond applying a general exceptions clause
like Miller, and instead anticipate examples of speech that a court may
advance as inappropriately regulated by the statute. The Stevens decision
enforces the importance for legislatures to develop highly specific
exceptions clauses, along with other tactics, to narrowly tailor statutes that
may affect First Amendment rights. By doing so, legislative bodies can
effectively ensure that their arguments for a new unprotected category of
speech are viewed on the merits, and not avoided by a court applying the
overbreadth doctrine. Further, "clear guidelines formulated by a
responsible policymaking body are more persuasive of governmental
interest in intervention than the situational judgment of an administrator or
enforcement agent acting perhaps with narrow regulatory aims."1 25 A
narrowly written statute bolsters the argument in support of the
government's infringement on speech.
From a normative perspective, drafting exceptions clauses with more
specific language than the Miller standard should be a priority regardless of
a court's review. Exceptions clauses are important for fair and precise laws,
and precise laws are easier to follow for the public. For law enforcement,
precise laws are easier to enforce. Narrowly tailored laws limit the
discretion and potential corruption of overzealous or improperly-motivated
124. See Brown v. Entrn't Merchs. Ass'n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2761-71 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
125. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 24, at 857-58.
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law enforcement. The First Amendment is often lauded as the most
important protection under the United States Constitution,126 so clear
regulations are especially important in this sensitive area of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the majority opinion in United States v. Stevens may
pose serious ramifications for current and future legislatures that advocate
for a new category of unprotected speech. However, as this Note suggests,
Stevens's impact extends beyond the Supreme Court's reluctance to create
new categories of unprotected speech.
The Supreme Court's use of overbreadth analysis in Stevens
undermines the importance of an exceptions clause modeled after the
Miller obscenity standard when it is used in a nonobscenity statute. Future
legislatures that advocate for new unprotected categories of speech should
be wary of adopting the exceptions clause from the Miller obscenity
standard. Instead, legislatures should narrowly tailor their statutes with
more precise language that will prevent a court from creating hypotheticals
to suggest that the statute is overbroad. By doing so, legislatures will avoid
being prescribed the "strong medicine" of overbreadth and force courts to
examine the merits of arguments advocating for a new category of
unprotected speech.
126. The fact that the Supreme Court allows an overbreadth challenge as a unique
exception to standing demonstrates the high level of respect for the First Amendment.
"[Tjhis departure from the normal method of judging the constitutionality of statutes []
find[s] justification in the favored status of rights to expression and association in the
constitutional scheme." Id. at 852.
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